剧照
更新时间：2023-09-01 12:04
详细剧情
一场车祸，母亲丧生，而孩子却奇迹般幸存，他赤裸着身体获救，然而救人者竟然是来自未来的自己。原来，这个名叫亨利（艾瑞克•巴纳 Eric Bana 饰）的图书管理员，患上慢性时间错位症，以至于每次发病都将穿越时空。而且，他每次穿越都赤身裸体，经常闹出笑话。久而久之，亨利习以为常。一个偶然的机会，他爱上了一个名叫克莱尔（瑞秋•麦克亚当斯 Rachel McAdams 饰）的女孩。为了追求克莱尔，他穿越时空对6岁的克莱尔表白，并许诺未来将娶她为妻。因此，当亨利在现实中出现时，两人迅速热恋、结婚，而且还生了一个女孩。但是，亨利的老毛病依旧无法改变，所以克莱尔必须适应这个穿越时空的老公，两人也因此历经磨难…… 本片改编自美国作家奥黛丽•尼芬格(Audrey Niffenegger)创作的同名畅销小说。
长篇影评
1 ) 两情若是长久时，又岂在朝朝暮暮？
很喜欢《时光旅行者的妻子》小说封面，弥漫的是一种睹物思人的惆怅与感伤。美丽的小女孩一生都在守望，时间在她身上打下一个个清晰的印记，挥之不去；可时间却留不住她唯一钟爱的人。
相爱总是简单，想处太难。
于是，在两个人终生相爱却难得聚首的爱情故事里，我们依稀听到一个在感慨时光留不住、一个在感慨留不住时光的画外音——
亨利：
三岁那个大雪纷飞的圣诞前夕，母亲的车里满是幸福快乐的气息，丝毫感觉不到死亡在一步步逼近。当母亲美妙的歌声终成人间绝响，死亡带去的，不单是快乐的天伦，还有从此不再有的正常生活。时空，在那个惊恐流血的孩子面前，因为未来另一个自我的出现，从此错乱。
在不由自主的过去、现在、未来的时空穿梭中，亨利永远不知道命运之手下一刻将会带来什么样的安排。有时候，他是个年轻帅气的英俊小伙，有时候，他是个写满沧桑的中年汉子。他似乎半生都在寻找：寻找自己身在何处、身处何时，每一次在弄清这些之前，他都要狼狈不堪地胡乱找几件蔽体的衣服，因为每一次时空旅行驾驭的只有赤条条的身体，并无任何身外之物，当然，身体里带着的，还有每个时空里片段的记忆。
这些记忆，亨利自己无法像拼图般凑出完整的全景。于是，一个个不同时间不同地点的亨利，有时候独来独往，有时候互相观望。来自未来的亨利有时候会困惑、有时候又会嫉妒，在看着另一个不同时空中的亨利的时候。
遗憾的是，谁也没有办法治疗亨利患上的前所未有的基因错乱病症。也是因着在每一个时空中被动地停留、被动地离去，亨利似乎也没可能正常地求医问诊。时空旅行中给旁人留下的，只有一堆堆不同的衣物，提醒人们这一堆衣物，也许曾经温暖过一个离去的人。
克莱尔：
从六岁那个夏天在后园意外碰到这个藏身草丛的中年人后，最初的好奇被渐生的好感取代，我惊讶地发现自己不可抑制地爱上了他——一个自称来自未来时空的人。我不知道从衣物中突然遁走的他什么时候才会回来，唯一能做的，便是之后把他每次回来的日子记录下来。
终于，在那个最好最合适的时空里，我又见到了亨利，一个年轻倜傥的图书馆员。尽管我们在这之前已经见过百多次，但这个时空里，亨利显然并不认识我——一个从六岁开始一直等待，只为在正常时空里正常遇见再正常表白的喜欢他的女孩。看着有些惶恐有些困惑的亨利，我只好尽量清楚地解释：我们尽管已经相遇多次，但都是亨利从未来穿越到过去；未有这一次，是在不错乱的时空里的正常相遇。
人生里有多少的等待，只为一刹那的相会？有了一刹那的相会，又有谁能不相约永久，分秒必珍？可是，命运早早就写下安排，由不得被动的人生奋力争取。相聚的每一个时刻面临的也许都是未知的结局，即便已经看清，又有几人能改写？看着亨利一次次突然消逝，我唯一能做的，便是收拾起还留着他体温的衣物，在他下一个可能出现的地方守候。
我不介意在年岁渐长的过程中一次次遇见不同年龄的亨利，因为我知道，亨利在每一次穿越中，为的都是和我短暂的重逢。有时候我也怀疑是不是已经把亨利当成长了翅膀的天使，飞来飞去只是为了带给我幸福与快乐。
我其实早该想到在这样辛苦的、不能自己的时光旅行中，亨利会遭遇各种不可预知的命运。是的，被动的人生不需要选择，顺从是唯一的宿命。于是，穿梭自未来的亨利与同样穿梭于未来的我们的孩子终于相遇，从孩子口中得知自己最终的宿命。这一次，亨利依然没有选择的可能，却悄悄为我和孩子留下了充满爱的未来气息。
亨利许是累了，许是厌倦了人生的来来往往。像飞絮般在空气中游离的，是亨利留下的爱的气息——
两情若是长久时，又岂在朝朝暮暮？
相爱总是简单，想处太难。
于是，在两个人终生相爱却难得聚首的爱情故事里，我们依稀听到一个在感慨时光留不住、一个在感慨留不住时光的画外音——
亨利：
三岁那个大雪纷飞的圣诞前夕，母亲的车里满是幸福快乐的气息，丝毫感觉不到死亡在一步步逼近。当母亲美妙的歌声终成人间绝响，死亡带去的，不单是快乐的天伦，还有从此不再有的正常生活。时空，在那个惊恐流血的孩子面前，因为未来另一个自我的出现，从此错乱。
在不由自主的过去、现在、未来的时空穿梭中，亨利永远不知道命运之手下一刻将会带来什么样的安排。有时候，他是个年轻帅气的英俊小伙，有时候，他是个写满沧桑的中年汉子。他似乎半生都在寻找：寻找自己身在何处、身处何时，每一次在弄清这些之前，他都要狼狈不堪地胡乱找几件蔽体的衣服，因为每一次时空旅行驾驭的只有赤条条的身体，并无任何身外之物，当然，身体里带着的，还有每个时空里片段的记忆。
这些记忆，亨利自己无法像拼图般凑出完整的全景。于是，一个个不同时间不同地点的亨利，有时候独来独往，有时候互相观望。来自未来的亨利有时候会困惑、有时候又会嫉妒，在看着另一个不同时空中的亨利的时候。
遗憾的是，谁也没有办法治疗亨利患上的前所未有的基因错乱病症。也是因着在每一个时空中被动地停留、被动地离去，亨利似乎也没可能正常地求医问诊。时空旅行中给旁人留下的，只有一堆堆不同的衣物，提醒人们这一堆衣物，也许曾经温暖过一个离去的人。
克莱尔：
从六岁那个夏天在后园意外碰到这个藏身草丛的中年人后，最初的好奇被渐生的好感取代，我惊讶地发现自己不可抑制地爱上了他——一个自称来自未来时空的人。我不知道从衣物中突然遁走的他什么时候才会回来，唯一能做的，便是之后把他每次回来的日子记录下来。
终于，在那个最好最合适的时空里，我又见到了亨利，一个年轻倜傥的图书馆员。尽管我们在这之前已经见过百多次，但这个时空里，亨利显然并不认识我——一个从六岁开始一直等待，只为在正常时空里正常遇见再正常表白的喜欢他的女孩。看着有些惶恐有些困惑的亨利，我只好尽量清楚地解释：我们尽管已经相遇多次，但都是亨利从未来穿越到过去；未有这一次，是在不错乱的时空里的正常相遇。
人生里有多少的等待，只为一刹那的相会？有了一刹那的相会，又有谁能不相约永久，分秒必珍？可是，命运早早就写下安排，由不得被动的人生奋力争取。相聚的每一个时刻面临的也许都是未知的结局，即便已经看清，又有几人能改写？看着亨利一次次突然消逝，我唯一能做的，便是收拾起还留着他体温的衣物，在他下一个可能出现的地方守候。
我不介意在年岁渐长的过程中一次次遇见不同年龄的亨利，因为我知道，亨利在每一次穿越中，为的都是和我短暂的重逢。有时候我也怀疑是不是已经把亨利当成长了翅膀的天使，飞来飞去只是为了带给我幸福与快乐。
我其实早该想到在这样辛苦的、不能自己的时光旅行中，亨利会遭遇各种不可预知的命运。是的，被动的人生不需要选择，顺从是唯一的宿命。于是，穿梭自未来的亨利与同样穿梭于未来的我们的孩子终于相遇，从孩子口中得知自己最终的宿命。这一次，亨利依然没有选择的可能，却悄悄为我和孩子留下了充满爱的未来气息。
亨利许是累了，许是厌倦了人生的来来往往。像飞絮般在空气中游离的，是亨利留下的爱的气息——
两情若是长久时，又岂在朝朝暮暮？
2 ) 我不怕等你，只怕你不再回来
自始至尾都以非常平静的心情看这部电影，直到电影的最后，看到女主角一路狂奔，奔到原本已经死去的丈夫面前，俩人紧紧相拥的画面，我的眼眶还是忍不住湿润了。
时空旅行的能力没有想象中的那么好玩，这种能力折磨着对过去有无限遗憾和悔恨的能力者，也折磨着能力者的爱人。时空旅行者的妻子从恋爱时期开始就必须习惯恋人的长期失踪和突然降临。
电影最后的最后，短暂的相聚后他还是在她面前消失了，她像往常一样冷静地收拾好摊在地上的刚刚还穿在他身上的衣服，拥着女儿回家去。
“我一直觉得好像他就躲在周围，随时准备出来给我们一个惊喜”。女儿这样说。
原著中丈夫写给妻子的诀别情书电影里没有体现固然可惜，但我觉得这样的结局也很好。
一直折磨着他们的时空旅行的能力，这时也成为一种礼物。虽然他已经去世了，但是说不定哪一天，曾经年轻的他穿越时空来到现在的自己面前，就像以前一样，突然消失一段时间之后，总会回来的。心里对生活依然有期待，有相聚的幸福即使很短暂，就像丈夫还陪在身边一样。
他一直说：我不想让你等。
殊不知，女人不怕等，怕只怕你走了就再也不回来。
女人一辈子都在等。等他的出现，等他跟自己约会，等他向自己求婚，等他的吻，等他下班，等他回家，等他成熟，等他懂得珍惜自己，等他回心转意……
这些女人都等得了。她爱你就能用一辈子来等你。
只是请你不要永远不回来。
所以，当克莱尔喜极地投入本来已经死去的亨利的怀抱中时。我真的高兴得想哭了。
细细回味整个故事整部电影，你就会发现这是一段很平淡很平淡，但是很伟大的爱情。
用原著中亨利写给克莱尔的诀别情书中的很感人的一段作为结尾：
克莱尔，我想再次告诉你，我爱你。这些年来，我们之间的爱，一直是汪洋的苦海中指航的明灯，是高空钢索步行者身下的安全网，是我怪诞生活中惟一的真实，惟一的信任。今晚我觉得，我对你的爱，比我自己，更紧紧地抓着这个世界：仿佛在我之后，我的爱还可以留下来，包围你，追随你，抱紧你。
我想，这也正是最隽永的，超越生死的感情。
时空旅行的能力没有想象中的那么好玩，这种能力折磨着对过去有无限遗憾和悔恨的能力者，也折磨着能力者的爱人。时空旅行者的妻子从恋爱时期开始就必须习惯恋人的长期失踪和突然降临。
电影最后的最后，短暂的相聚后他还是在她面前消失了，她像往常一样冷静地收拾好摊在地上的刚刚还穿在他身上的衣服，拥着女儿回家去。
“我一直觉得好像他就躲在周围，随时准备出来给我们一个惊喜”。女儿这样说。
原著中丈夫写给妻子的诀别情书电影里没有体现固然可惜，但我觉得这样的结局也很好。
一直折磨着他们的时空旅行的能力，这时也成为一种礼物。虽然他已经去世了，但是说不定哪一天，曾经年轻的他穿越时空来到现在的自己面前，就像以前一样，突然消失一段时间之后，总会回来的。心里对生活依然有期待，有相聚的幸福即使很短暂，就像丈夫还陪在身边一样。
他一直说：我不想让你等。
殊不知，女人不怕等，怕只怕你走了就再也不回来。
女人一辈子都在等。等他的出现，等他跟自己约会，等他向自己求婚，等他的吻，等他下班，等他回家，等他成熟，等他懂得珍惜自己，等他回心转意……
这些女人都等得了。她爱你就能用一辈子来等你。
只是请你不要永远不回来。
所以，当克莱尔喜极地投入本来已经死去的亨利的怀抱中时。我真的高兴得想哭了。
细细回味整个故事整部电影，你就会发现这是一段很平淡很平淡，但是很伟大的爱情。
用原著中亨利写给克莱尔的诀别情书中的很感人的一段作为结尾：
克莱尔，我想再次告诉你，我爱你。这些年来，我们之间的爱，一直是汪洋的苦海中指航的明灯，是高空钢索步行者身下的安全网，是我怪诞生活中惟一的真实，惟一的信任。今晚我觉得，我对你的爱，比我自己，更紧紧地抓着这个世界：仿佛在我之后，我的爱还可以留下来，包围你，追随你，抱紧你。
我想，这也正是最隽永的，超越生死的感情。
3 ) 长短句
一、多个时空
《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。
我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。
尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）
若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。
于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。
二、沉默，或消失
影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。
克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。
我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。
很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。
三、看着，却无法改变
在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。
不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。
每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。
四、期限
有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。
亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。
于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。
女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。
一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。
而，这不正是人生么。
——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass
Introduction
In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance
In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.
Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass
In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.
Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience
I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.
Section IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.
《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。
我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。
尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）
若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。
于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。
二、沉默，或消失
影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。
克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。
我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。
很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。
三、看着，却无法改变
在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。
不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。
每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。
四、期限
有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。
亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。
于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。
女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。
一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。
而，这不正是人生么。
——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass
Introduction
In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance
In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.
Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass
In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.
Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience
I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.
Section IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.
4 ) 等待比时间更长
你愿不愿意 这样的等一个人。你愿不愿意 等这样的一个人。
他看上去有一点邋遢，却总是肆意的闯进你的生活里。
6岁那年，他借走了你本用来野餐的毛毯。他说自己是身不由己的时间旅行者，他说你们是朋友，在你长大以后。阳光好美，你需要抬起头才看得见他褐色深邃的眸。然后，在你选择相信的那一秒，这个男人，伴着阳光，就那么一点一点的消失了。
等待 就是从那时候开始的吧。
12岁的时候，你开始嫉妒他的妻子，他笑着对你说他很爱她。15岁的时候，他神经兮兮的吻了你，在你给了他一个耳光之后。18岁生日的那天，你终于成为了他的女人。
他叫Henry，这一秒还在下一秒就消失的Henry。而你是Claire，那个永远都在等待Henry回来的Claire。
你说 "I‘ve been waiting for Henry my entire life ".
可他却说"I can't stay"。你明明知道的。
你知道他亲眼目睹了母亲的车祸，你知道他这么多年一直都好痛苦，
你知道他混乱的过去 无可避免的未来，你知道他什么都没有。
可你还是这么一直的等。等到连他也忍不住要问你"why？ why do you like me？"
"Because you are my perfect guy."
因为你知道，这个叫Henry的男人是怎样的爱着你。因为你知道，即使他在你的生命中来来回回，可是爱情，从未走散。
It's you.Henry.
“谢谢你，让我在最美好的年华里，遇见你。谢谢你，给我的所有温暖 和回忆。”
——For "The Time Traveler's Wife"
他看上去有一点邋遢，却总是肆意的闯进你的生活里。
6岁那年，他借走了你本用来野餐的毛毯。他说自己是身不由己的时间旅行者，他说你们是朋友，在你长大以后。阳光好美，你需要抬起头才看得见他褐色深邃的眸。然后，在你选择相信的那一秒，这个男人，伴着阳光，就那么一点一点的消失了。
等待 就是从那时候开始的吧。
12岁的时候，你开始嫉妒他的妻子，他笑着对你说他很爱她。15岁的时候，他神经兮兮的吻了你，在你给了他一个耳光之后。18岁生日的那天，你终于成为了他的女人。
他叫Henry，这一秒还在下一秒就消失的Henry。而你是Claire，那个永远都在等待Henry回来的Claire。
你说 "I‘ve been waiting for Henry my entire life ".
可他却说"I can't stay"。你明明知道的。
你知道他亲眼目睹了母亲的车祸，你知道他这么多年一直都好痛苦，
你知道他混乱的过去 无可避免的未来，你知道他什么都没有。
可你还是这么一直的等。等到连他也忍不住要问你"why？ why do you like me？"
"Because you are my perfect guy."
因为你知道，这个叫Henry的男人是怎样的爱着你。因为你知道，即使他在你的生命中来来回回，可是爱情，从未走散。
It's you.Henry.
“谢谢你，让我在最美好的年华里，遇见你。谢谢你，给我的所有温暖 和回忆。”
——For "The Time Traveler's Wife"
5 ) 爱是永恒
《时间旅行者的妻子》并非科幻故事，最多也就是与科幻轻微擦边。书的最大读点是作者Audrey Niffenegger的文笔，她笔下那些草地、阳光、雪，就像小溪水一样清澈温柔地哗啦啦流淌，实在精致极了，小资得一塌糊涂。而“小资”对一个作家来说，该是一把双刃剑：一方面说明他或她的写作内容缺乏深度，浮于表象，商业化商品化；另一方面，是文笔安排具有独特风格，阅读的过程顺畅轻松，虽然读后并不留下丰富的营养，但作为时光消遣，仍不乏可读性。
《时间旅行者的妻子》中，旅行者亨利生来天赋异丙，或者说DNA病变，经常毫无预兆的出现在他时他地，也因此认识了他将终生挚爱的妻子克莱儿。克莱儿第一次见亨利时才六岁，一个天真小人和一个落魄大人的对话读来饶有新意。克莱儿的成长使得这个爱情故事区别于其他的情感小说，多了一层趣味性；但这个趣味却仅限于一个女孩子对青春的试探与沮丧，并无时代感。相对的，倒是亨利这个男性人物形象更为坚实复杂，因为他无法控制自己的时空穿梭，又不能携带任何物品，所以每到新的空间都是光着身子四处寻找衣服、食物和避难所——故事发生在美国芝加哥，冬季长达半年，大雪封城严寒冰冻的时候光着身子半夜被丢在陌生街上的存活率可想而知。亨利在享受时间旅行的神奇美妙之时（时间旅行救过他的命），也必须随时准备忍受时间旅行的残酷无情。不仅如此，为了不让毫无办法的克莱儿焦虑，他并不能倾诉心中这些恐惧。正因为如此，亨利的无助自弃与抗争才更为真实，他终于意识到爱超越时空的力量感也才更有感染力。
书的最高潮无疑是亨利等待死亡到来之前的心理描绘，那种抑郁、恐惧、不舍的痛感仿佛从纸面上殷出来一样，读得人胆颤心惊。这样的惧怕死亡，实在是因为亨利先前与克莱儿一路走来共同成长的爱情太过美好，两个人都奋不顾身的要留住彼此在对方心内的印记，于是才恐惧失去，在死亡的阴影下郁郁寡欢，一遍遍让记忆重播、切割、撕扯，竭尽全力抓住明知将要逝去的生命。一个真正热爱生活的人面对死亡是绝无法坦然的，哪怕表面再风平浪静，内心那份不舍的翻涌都会噬咬得人发疯——这种痛感在亨利的自述中再明晰不过，很难释怀。
由书改编的电影在视觉画面上保留了Audrey Niffenegger语言的清新感和柔软度，十分精致。刻画得比较成功的是克莱儿（Rachel Adams），她独自等待的落寞和对爱的坚持都有充分的细节描绘；亨利（Eric Bana）的部分则较薄弱，尤其是为了表述他时间旅行的原理，穿梭部分介绍过多，人物“动”多“静”少。而作为书中最感人部分的亨利面对生命离去的思考在电影中则被略过——好莱坞的路数较适合于连贯的快速剪切叙事，却不长于以大胆的静止画面来展现人物的细微心理。比较一下展示克莱儿因亨利总是不受控制的随时消失而长久等待的心理失落，用的是配乐快切，幻灯片一样从一个场景过渡到下一个场景，在动态中映衬人物；而要展示亨利的苦闷，难免要运用对克莱尔背影长久凝视或眼神放空一类的长镜头，这种什么都不发生的慢节奏在欧洲文艺电影中常见，若放到更讲究连贯叙事的好莱坞爱情片中，则显然会频率失调。
电影结尾亨利与克莱儿的再次相见与书中二人在博物馆台阶上咫尺天涯相比也丧失了很多意犹未尽的回味。毕竟， “帮我们抓住过去的，是回忆；带我们走向未来的，是梦想。”而爱，则是连接过去与未来的中坚能量，它并不一定要面对面亲自讲明，它无所不在，它穿越时空，它能帮我们留住生命中的所有珍贵瞬间。
《时间旅行者的妻子》中，旅行者亨利生来天赋异丙，或者说DNA病变，经常毫无预兆的出现在他时他地，也因此认识了他将终生挚爱的妻子克莱儿。克莱儿第一次见亨利时才六岁，一个天真小人和一个落魄大人的对话读来饶有新意。克莱儿的成长使得这个爱情故事区别于其他的情感小说，多了一层趣味性；但这个趣味却仅限于一个女孩子对青春的试探与沮丧，并无时代感。相对的，倒是亨利这个男性人物形象更为坚实复杂，因为他无法控制自己的时空穿梭，又不能携带任何物品，所以每到新的空间都是光着身子四处寻找衣服、食物和避难所——故事发生在美国芝加哥，冬季长达半年，大雪封城严寒冰冻的时候光着身子半夜被丢在陌生街上的存活率可想而知。亨利在享受时间旅行的神奇美妙之时（时间旅行救过他的命），也必须随时准备忍受时间旅行的残酷无情。不仅如此，为了不让毫无办法的克莱儿焦虑，他并不能倾诉心中这些恐惧。正因为如此，亨利的无助自弃与抗争才更为真实，他终于意识到爱超越时空的力量感也才更有感染力。
书的最高潮无疑是亨利等待死亡到来之前的心理描绘，那种抑郁、恐惧、不舍的痛感仿佛从纸面上殷出来一样，读得人胆颤心惊。这样的惧怕死亡，实在是因为亨利先前与克莱儿一路走来共同成长的爱情太过美好，两个人都奋不顾身的要留住彼此在对方心内的印记，于是才恐惧失去，在死亡的阴影下郁郁寡欢，一遍遍让记忆重播、切割、撕扯，竭尽全力抓住明知将要逝去的生命。一个真正热爱生活的人面对死亡是绝无法坦然的，哪怕表面再风平浪静，内心那份不舍的翻涌都会噬咬得人发疯——这种痛感在亨利的自述中再明晰不过，很难释怀。
由书改编的电影在视觉画面上保留了Audrey Niffenegger语言的清新感和柔软度，十分精致。刻画得比较成功的是克莱儿（Rachel Adams），她独自等待的落寞和对爱的坚持都有充分的细节描绘；亨利（Eric Bana）的部分则较薄弱，尤其是为了表述他时间旅行的原理，穿梭部分介绍过多，人物“动”多“静”少。而作为书中最感人部分的亨利面对生命离去的思考在电影中则被略过——好莱坞的路数较适合于连贯的快速剪切叙事，却不长于以大胆的静止画面来展现人物的细微心理。比较一下展示克莱儿因亨利总是不受控制的随时消失而长久等待的心理失落，用的是配乐快切，幻灯片一样从一个场景过渡到下一个场景，在动态中映衬人物；而要展示亨利的苦闷，难免要运用对克莱尔背影长久凝视或眼神放空一类的长镜头，这种什么都不发生的慢节奏在欧洲文艺电影中常见，若放到更讲究连贯叙事的好莱坞爱情片中，则显然会频率失调。
电影结尾亨利与克莱儿的再次相见与书中二人在博物馆台阶上咫尺天涯相比也丧失了很多意犹未尽的回味。毕竟， “帮我们抓住过去的，是回忆；带我们走向未来的，是梦想。”而爱，则是连接过去与未来的中坚能量，它并不一定要面对面亲自讲明，它无所不在，它穿越时空，它能帮我们留住生命中的所有珍贵瞬间。
6 ) 消失的光年
开头便要说要想看剧透的可以叉掉这个页面了。
最近博客大巴也被封了，一来没处发牢骚，二来许久没写影评了
索性就在这写一篇。
这部电影是期待了很久了，今天难得找了个还算清晰的版本，
可惜字幕处理的还不算完善，好在也比较快的看到了。
而且重点是还是免费的。在家里看的，电影院估计是不会上映了。
最近电影院正在热捧"啊凡达"，今天听朋友说到电影院又没买到票。
老实说我很反感炒的过热的片子，觉得很多都是片商有意找的托。
豆瓣上现在也充斥着，所以我现在看电影一般只看个介绍，
等到看完了 才看看评论。
我很喜欢"穿越"这个型材，初看这本书的时候是在好友的最爱书目中
真心推荐喜欢这部电影的人看看原著小说
我记得看完小说的时候还写过一篇类似书评的东西
当时被这本书深深吸引 很难自拔 合上书 久久不能平静
我当时总在想能穿越是什么样的感觉呢
也许能看到小时候的自己 也许能看到小时候养过的猫
记得在看『我的女友是机器人』的时候，
男主角随机器人女友回到家乡的那段真是令人泪奔。
当时就想 要是我也能穿越多好啊
那些遗忘的时光 那些消失的光年 也许能再重温一遍
最近也算看了许多和穿越有关的电影 MV
仔细想想 还是不要穿越比较好
可能真的是 看的人觉得很刺激 身在其中的人想逃却找不到出口
最近 我在想 与其抱着要是一切能重新开始怎样怎样
还不如好好把握现在
看看自己的现在 至少也不算太坏
有时候 我也会希望 不开心能快点过去
好想快快穿越 可是人生就是这样
怎么想逃都不是办法
人生是场狩猎。
你无论如何也跑不过时间，也许最后我们都输了。
但是 姿态也很重要
我还在追寻着时间 我不祈求它变慢 变快
我只是希望 能在快乐的时候静静享受
难过的时候 等待它过去
最后喜剧收尾
只要结局是好的
只要结果是好的
最近博客大巴也被封了，一来没处发牢骚，二来许久没写影评了
索性就在这写一篇。
这部电影是期待了很久了，今天难得找了个还算清晰的版本，
可惜字幕处理的还不算完善，好在也比较快的看到了。
而且重点是还是免费的。在家里看的，电影院估计是不会上映了。
最近电影院正在热捧"啊凡达"，今天听朋友说到电影院又没买到票。
老实说我很反感炒的过热的片子，觉得很多都是片商有意找的托。
豆瓣上现在也充斥着，所以我现在看电影一般只看个介绍，
等到看完了 才看看评论。
我很喜欢"穿越"这个型材，初看这本书的时候是在好友的最爱书目中
真心推荐喜欢这部电影的人看看原著小说
我记得看完小说的时候还写过一篇类似书评的东西
当时被这本书深深吸引 很难自拔 合上书 久久不能平静
我当时总在想能穿越是什么样的感觉呢
也许能看到小时候的自己 也许能看到小时候养过的猫
记得在看『我的女友是机器人』的时候，
男主角随机器人女友回到家乡的那段真是令人泪奔。
当时就想 要是我也能穿越多好啊
那些遗忘的时光 那些消失的光年 也许能再重温一遍
最近也算看了许多和穿越有关的电影 MV
仔细想想 还是不要穿越比较好
可能真的是 看的人觉得很刺激 身在其中的人想逃却找不到出口
最近 我在想 与其抱着要是一切能重新开始怎样怎样
还不如好好把握现在
看看自己的现在 至少也不算太坏
有时候 我也会希望 不开心能快点过去
好想快快穿越 可是人生就是这样
怎么想逃都不是办法
人生是场狩猎。
你无论如何也跑不过时间，也许最后我们都输了。
但是 姿态也很重要
我还在追寻着时间 我不祈求它变慢 变快
我只是希望 能在快乐的时候静静享受
难过的时候 等待它过去
最后喜剧收尾
只要结局是好的
只要结果是好的
我们都是时间旅者, 只不过, 在一直向前.
电影果然不如书
时空之妙幻
03年小说还没出版的时候，还是伉俪的布莱德·彼德和詹妮佛·安尼斯顿就从作者那里拿到了电影版权，甚至连书名都是他们建议的，可惜这对好莱坞的金童玉女还没等到电影开拍就分道扬镳了——我心目中最理想的亨利和克莱尔人选啊，唉！！爱情有时候真不像电影里这么可靠。
一位时间旅行者的一生，美丽而动人……
各种逻辑率的漏洞，穿越的时空似乎没有平行宇宙的物理规律支持，所以会改变历史，无论来自过去还是未来，而且还不知道是哪个年代的亨利时候改变的。那个中彩票就是这样，如果历史可以由任意穿越者改变，那我们的存在是基于什么样的物理规律？这是外祖父悖论。7.7
亲爱的，我和过去的你搞了一搞，搞出了咱们未来的女儿，没什么问题吧
若你只是不巧穿越在我这个时空中的一瞬，我愿用一生等待下一次重逢
初恋初吻出轨全跟同一个人也够不容易的……
这片子真无聊，俺唯一学到的东西就是打猎是不要的，因为很可能会误伤无辜的时间旅行者们……Orz..
她用一生的时间来等待和他的下一次相遇。
我不怕等你，只怕你不再回来
虽然没原著好看（我原著也没看完，看了一半╮(╯_╰)╭）但是还是温暖的。女主角非常beautiful！BTW:翻译字幕的那个人matt song很囧，好多个（听不懂），还有（祝词就不翻译了）（这个人是卖房子的，废话很多就不翻译了）。。。那你还翻译什么嘛？
没有被感动到。。。
很温暖的一部电影，时空错位的爱情女主坚持下来了。
本来想感动一把的...没感觉啊
她跃过树丛、跃过草坪，跃过从不停歇的时间长河，奔向自己从童年起就深爱着的、可能随时会消失在眼前的人，和他在金色的霞光中拥抱……我终于知道了，那么久的等待其实就为了这一抱。
时空穿梭，却不能改变什么。所以，请珍惜眼前人。
当年那些情话，大都随着时间流逝变成了笑话，但有些，会超越时间成为永恒。他们是如此珍视相处的每一刻，使得死亡也无法夺走这份爱，而是变成星辰在天上闪烁。
一个知道自己所限的人，真忧伤。